Focusing on Country Partnership Strategy by Hogeun Song
 
 
저 시-비 리- 경 지 2.0 한민  
는 아래  조건  르는 경 에 한하여 게 
l  저 물  복제, 포, 전송, 전시, 공연  송할 수 습니다.  
다 과 같  조건  라야 합니다: 
l 하는,  저 물  나 포  경 ,  저 물에 적 된 허락조건
 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.  
l 저 터  허가를 면 러한 조건들  적 되지 않습니다.  
저 에 른  리는  내 에 하여 향  지 않습니다. 




저 시. 하는 원저 를 시하여야 합니다. 
비 리. 하는  저 물  리 목적  할 수 없습니다. 
경 지. 하는  저 물  개 , 형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다. 
Master’s Thesis of Public Administration
An Analysis of Policy Transfer 
Process in Korean ODA Policy
- Focusing on Country Partnership Strategy -
정책 이전의 관점에서 본
한국 공적개발원조 정책 연구:
국가별협력전략을 중심으로
August 2019
Graduate School of Public Administration
Seoul National University
Global Public Administration Major
Song, Hogeun
i
An Analysis of Policy Transfer 
Process in Korean ODA Policy
- Focusing on Country Partnership Strategy -
Academic Advisor Kwon, Hyuk-Ju
Submitting a master’s thesis of 
Public Administration
August 2019
Graduate School of Public Administration
Seoul National University
Global Public Administration Major
Song, Hogeun
Confirming the master’s thesis written by
Song, Hogeun
August 2019
Chair Dostal, Jörg Michael (Seal)
Vice Chair Choi, Tae-Hyon   (Seal)
Examiner Kwon, Hyuk-Ju  (Seal)
i
Abstract
An Analysis of Policy Transfer 
Process in Korean ODA Policy
- Focusing on Country Partnership Strategy -
Song, Hogeun
Global Public Administration Major
The Graduate School of Public Administration
Seoul National University
Country Partnership Strategy (hereafter CPS) is a strategic 
framework for a donor country and an international aid agency 
regarding the overall official development assistance (hereafter 
ODA) policy toward priority partner countries. CPS typically 
includes core cooperation area, strategies in each area, and an 
implementation plan during a mid-and-long term and is written 
under the consultation with priority partner countries. CPS was 
created from international aid agencies in the 1990s and developed 
as a key ODA policy in the international ODA community, which 
includes international aid agencies and developed countries. 
Currently, CPS become one of the indicators which represents the 
quality of an ODA policy in certain countries. 
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Korea was a recipient country after the Korean War in 1950. 
However, on the strength of the miraculous economic development, 
Korea started to provide ODA through establishing Economic 
Development Cooperation Fund (hereafter EDCF) in 1987 and 
Korea International Cooperation Agency (hereafter KOICA) in 1991. 
Korea was excluded from the list of recipient country of 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereafter 
OECD) Development Assistance Committee (hereafter DAC), which 
is the international association of developed donor countries in 2000. 
In 2010, Korea became a member country of OECD DAC. As a 
late-runner of ODA, Korea actively learned about the ODA policy in 
international aid agencies and advanced donor countries to catch up 
with them. In this regard, Korea’s policy process for the ODA 
policy is better explained by the influence of other countries rather 
than rational decision-making models. CPS is a typical example of 
the policy transfer. Although the need for CPS was started from the 
2000s in Korea, a complete recognition of CPS were formulated 
after the recommendation of OECD DAC. Several documents about 
the decision-making process of the ODA policy in Korea provide 
evidence for such a process. 
Policy transfer theory, which refers to a process in which 
knowledge of policies in one institution is adopted by other 
institutions (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996), is a theoretical tool that 
provides an effective frame to analyze this process. Policy transfer 
theory also provides affluent explanations about policy transfer 
cases. The representative study of policy transfer is Dolowitz & 
Marsh’s research in 1996, which focuses on actors, motivations, 
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objects, degrees, origins, and factors for succession and failure of 
the policy transfer. I analyzed the policy process of CPS in Korea 
from the perspective of policy transfer theory of Dolowitz & Marsh
(1996). Since there are many preceding and follow-up studies 
regarding policy transfer, this study covers most of ideas of 
relevant researches, such as Bennett (1991a), Rose (1991), 
Dolowitz & Marsh (2000), Evans (2004), Fawcett & Marsh (2012), 
and Dolowitz (2017). 
Policy transfer of CPS in Korea was mainly initiated by the 
bureaucrats in OECD and Korean government. The motivation of 
policy transfer in the case of CPS in Korea seems to be a mixture of 
voluntary and coercive transfer. The objects of transfer were the 
concept, goals, processes, and contents. The degree of transfer was 
close to synthesis which is in the middle of copying and inspiration. 
Origins were advanced donor countries, including the United States., 
U.K, France, and Japan. Policy transfer of CPS seems to be 
successive in terms of process. However, it did not function 
sufficiently due to incomplete transfer. This analysis was conducted 
based on documents of Korean government, OECD, researches 
regarding CPS. Such documents provide plausible evidence of policy 
transfer in the formulation of CPS in Korea. 
This study confirms several implications regarding Korean ODA 
policy. First, the influence of international organization is significant 
in the formulation of ODA policy. In particular, OECD DAC regularly 
evaluates the ODA policy of each country, which makes each 
country respond to the document in a certain way in order to 
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maintain its reputation. Second, the ODA policy in Korea is 
formulated in a relatively short period of time owing to the policy 
transfer, thus, such a formulation can cause an incomplete transfer 
or superficial adoption. Third, policy transfer does not result in an 
expected outcome. In order to achieve the effectiveness of the 
policy, continuous efforts should be made after the adoption of a 
new policy. 
This study has several limitations. There are not sufficient data 
available regarding CPS in Korea. The research of policy transfer 
depends on evidence which confirms the direct adoption of a certain 
idea, program, and institution. Most of documents which 
demonstrate the process of policy transfer are from OECD DAC and 
Korean government while academic researches on the formulation 
of CPS are scarce. Additionally, the following factors can weaken 
objectivity and explanatory power: the studies on CPS is 
concentrated a short period of time; experiences of the policy-
makers are not reflected, and quantitative data has not been utilized.
Keyword : Official Development Assistance, Country Partnership 
Strategy, Policy Transfer, ODA, CPS
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1.1. Purpose of Study
The aim of this study is to examine the process of ODA 
policy in Korea in terms of policy transfer. Specifically, this study 
will focus on the Country Partnership Strategy (hereafter CPS) 
which was newly adopted in Korean ODA policy in 2011. 
The basic assumption of this study is that the ODA policy in 
Korea can be explained better through policy transfer theory 
rather than rational decision-making models. Rational decision-
making models include the following components: a clear 
understanding about all relevant goals, values, preferences, the 
examination of all alternatives for achieving goals, and selection of 
the most efficient alternative which maximizes the goals (Rainey 
2003). However, such a decision-making process might not be 
applied well in a country in which the modernization is initiated by 
the government (Bae, 2010). Yoo (2010) argued that Korea has 
greatly depended on observing oversees cases in formulating 
policy alternatives. Taking these points into consideration, 
analyzing a policy from the perspective of policy transfer, which 
refers to a process in which knowledge of policies in one 
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institution are adopted in other institutions (Dolowitz & Marsh, 
1996), seems to be more appropriate to explain the policy process 
in Korea. ODA is one of the most suitable areas to be analyzed 
from the perspective of policy transfer because policy-makers 
actively share their ideas about ODA through inter-governmental 
organizations (hereafter IGOs).
The applicability of policy transfer theory is supported by 
the following aspects. First, Korean government had a strong will 
to learn the system of other countries in formulating the ODA 
policy. Korea actively participated in the international ODA 
governance since the 2000s through obtaining the membership of 
Multilateral Development Bank (hereafter MDB), which means 
Korea needs to abide by guidelines for such organizations. Second, 
Korean’s ODA history is not rich, thus, the background research 
for the development of its own ODA policy is not affluent. Korea 
had been a recipient country for a long time. It has not been long 
that Korea became a major donor country until it obtained a
membership of OECD DAC in 2010. Third, the international 
organization has powerful tools to enforce their guidelines. OECD 
DAC examines the qualifications of applicant countries, and it 
regularly evaluates the overall policy of each member country. In 
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the case of Korea, ignoring the guideline of OECD DAC is not easy 
because it is widely referenced in the global ODA governance. 
In this sense, the framework of policy transfer may provide 
the most accurate explanation regarding the process of ODA policy 
in Korea. CPS is one of the most important policies in ODA area, 
and is recently adopted in Korea. Thus, this study focused on the 
formulation of CPS in Korea. Although several studies has been 
conducted since the formulation of CPS, there is no study which 
focused on the formulation process of CPS. 
Analyzing the formulation of CPS in Korea will contribute to 
the following aspects. First, it provides the empirical explanation 
regarding the decision-making process of Korea’s ODA policy. 
This study examines many government documents, relevant 
reports, and researches regarding the formulation of CPS to 
describe the decision-making process in Korea’s ODA policy. 
Second, this study describes a dynamic relationship between 
different policy actors in the process of policy transfer. Through 
observing the progress of CPS in Korea, this study demonstrates
the interaction between Korean government and OECD DAC. Third, 
this study provides practical lessons for the ODA policy through 
analyzing conditions of policy success in policy transfer. Policy 
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transfer theory provides several conditions for successful policy 
transfer. This study examined each condition for complete policy 
transfer in order to provide a desirable direction for the 
development of ODA policy in Korea. 
1.2. Methodology
This study is a qualitative case study focusing on Korea’s 
CPS from the perspective of policy transfer. Qualitative research 
refers to a research methodology which explores meanings and 
insights in a given situation (Strauss & Corbin, 2008). Qualitative 
research is an effective model which provides an in-depth 
understanding of a particular social phenomenon (Domholdt, 1993). 
Qualitative research has the following characteristics: it focuses on 
words rather than numbers, observes the world in its natural 
setting, interprets situations for understanding the meanings that 
people make from day to day life (Mohajan, 2018, 24). Qualitative 
research has strengths in in-depth analysis, interpreting non-
numerical data, providing insight for the causality, and dealing with 
difficult issues. Meanwhile, qualitative research has weakness in 
objectivity, clarity, and verifiability (Mohajan, 2018).
Qualitative research is a general concept which includes the 
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following research designs: case study, ethnography, action 
behavior, historical research, hermeneutics, ground theory, 
phenomenology (Creswell, 2009). Among those methodologies, 
case study refers to “ an in-depth exploration from multiple 
perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular 
project, policy, institution, program or system in a real life ”
(Simons, 2009, 21). Case studies can be both quantitative and 
qualitative. Case studies use multiple sources, such as survey 
results, documents, audio-video materials (Creswell, 2009). 
This study adopts a qualitative case study for the following 
reasons. First, this study focuses on the in-depth explanation of 
the formulation of CPS in Korea. A qualitative case study is the 
most appropriate research method which enables an in-depth 
analysis regarding a certain phenomenon in the society through 
examining multiple aspects of the phenomenon. Second, the data 
which will be used for the study is non-numerical, so quantitative 
approach is not applicable. In order to verify the applicability of 
policy transfer theory, words which are expressed in the decision-
making process are more appropriate than any numerical data. 
Third, since analyzing the policy process has limitations in utilizing 
experimental approach, this study focuses on observing the real 
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situation which occurred in the policy process in Korea.
Policy transfer theory provides a useful framework for 
analyzing the policy process which was formulated under the 
influence of foreign institution. Policy transfer theory provides 
multiple frames, such as actors, motivations, degrees, constraints, 
and completeness. Policy transfer theory also provides an insight 
which helps the interpretation of policy transfer cases through 
analyzing many precedent cases. Among many studies regarding 
policy transfer, this study utilized the study of Dolowitz and Marsh 
(1996), because their study acted as a landmark research which 
synthesized the precedents researches and facilitated follow-up 
researches regarding policy transfer. Additionally, the precedents 
researches and follow-up researches on policy transfer will be 
used for the comprehensive understanding of CPS in Korea. 
This study will analyze the written document of the relevant 
actors in the formulation of CPS in Korea. Official government 
documents, reports of international aid agencies, and researches on 
CPS were analyzed for the evidence finding and interpretation of 
the policy process. Although there is a problem of the subjectivity 
of interpretation due to the nature of the qualitative study, the 
validity of the study can be complemented by cross-validation of 
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the interpretation quoted by a public institution such as an
international organization and evaluation of the experts. 
This study will deal with the whole period from the 
introduction of CPS to the current phase. However, as the 
government documents of Korea which deals with CPS was not 
published before 2006, a detailed analysis had to be focus on 
documents published after 2006.
Considering limitations of this study, it may have weak 
applicability in explaining the case of other countries or other 
policies in Korea, because this study examined a single case. 
Second, this study could not examine governmental internal 
documents on decision-making so it could not fully deal with the 
decision-making process of CPS. Lastly, since the history of 
Korea’s CPS is not long, it may be premature to evaluate the 
achievement of the policy. Such limitations need to be 
complemented by further researches.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review and 
Analytical Framework
2.1. Research Objective: ODA and CPS in Korea
2.1.1. Overview of ODA
ODA refers to an assistance which is provided from a 
government or an agency of the government for the development of 
developing countries, regions, or international organizations. The 
type of ODA is categorized as a grant and a loan. A grant means 
cash, goods, and services without a requirement of repayment or 
redemption. A loan means cash, goods, and services which should 
be repaid. Only a concessional loan which provides certain favorable 
conditions to recipient countries is recognized as an ODA loan. 
Donors provide ODA with various purposes, such as humanitarian, 
political, and economic purposes. The universal object of ODA is 
poverty reduction. Additionally, economic development, the spread 
of democracy, peace-keeping, and sustainable development are 
suggested as objectives of ODA (ODAKOREA, 2019).
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2.1.2. History of ODA
The concept of ODA in the modern context began from the 
Marshall Plan after World War Ⅱ. ODA had been used as a tool to 
strengthen the power of each camp in the Cold War era. ODA was 
also used as a tool of influence on former colonial countries 
(Hubbard & Duggan, 2009). The goal of poverty reduction became 
apparent in the global ODA trend in the 1970s. Global ODA 
governance recognized the need for direct support for poor 
population, which was a progress from the perspective that poverty 
can be resolved through economic development. The amount of 
ODA resources gradually increased as more countries, such as 
Japan and middle east countries increased their commitment. The 
expansion of Non-Governmental Organizations also contributed to 
the increase of ODA. In 1990, a skeptical perspective regarding the 
effectiveness of ODA was raised because many developing 
countries did not show a significant achievement (ODAKOREA, 
2019). On the contrary, many indicators showed regression of 
economic development in the recipient countries (Hubbard & 
Duggan, 2009). Such results and researches (Boone, 1994; Douglas 
& Hansen, 2001), which support the skeptical perspective regarding 
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the effectiveness of ODA, facilitated a movement which emphasizes 
the effectiveness of ODA (Kim & Kim, 2011). In 2000, the UN 
adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for the 
universal commitment of member countries towards poverty 
reduction, universal education, gender equality, etc. Five years later, 
five principles for the effectiveness of aid were adopted in Paris. 
The discourse of ODA developed to “Aid and Beyond”, which lead 
to an adoption of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015,
which include more diversified issues than MDGs. While MDGs 
focus on resolving extreme poverties and meeting basic 
requirements as human beings, SDGs include issues which exceed 
the boundary of aid, such as industry, climate, and decent work. 
2.1.3. Overview of ODA in Korea
The history of ODA in Korea can be divided into two 
categories: a history as a recipient country, and a history as a donor 
country. Since the history as a recipient country officially ended in 
2000 when Korea was excluded from the list of recipient countries 
of OECD DAC, this study will focus on the ongoing history, which is 
history as a donor country. Korea’s history as a donor country 
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goes back to the 1960s through hosting a training program for 
public officials from developing countries. Korean government 
began substantive ODA policies with the establishment of EDCF in 
1987, which refers to a concessional loan to developing countries. 
When Korean government established the KOICA in 1991, which 
provides a grant for developing countries, the current ODA system 
that offers both grant and loans has been completed. Since 1991, 
Korean ODA has been implemented mainly through the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
(ODAKOREA, 2019).
In the 2000s, as the public interest towards ODA increasing, 
the amount of ODA significantly increased. In 2006, the 
International Development Cooperation Committee was established 
under the Prime Minister 's Office as an integrated governance of 
ODA in Korea. As a result, Korean government obtained a strong 
momentum for further development of ODA policy. Korea became 
the 24th member of OECD DAC in 2010. In the same year, Korean 
government enacted the Framework Act on International 
Development Cooperation (Framework Act) and devised a Strategic 
Plan for International Development Cooperation (7th CIDC, 2010).
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2.1.4. Overview of CPS
2.1.4.1. The Origin and Importance of CPS
CPS refers to a framework which includes mid-and-long 
term aid plan towards the priority partner country. ADB (2009, 1) 
defines CPS as “the primary platform for designing operational 
programs to deliver development results at the country level”. 
Many terms are used for naming CPS. ADB also used different 
terms before it officially uses “CPS.” WB use Country 
Partnership Framework (CPF) currently. However, WB also uses 
“CPS” in its news section. OECD officially uses “CPS” in its 
documents, such as peer review. In this study, we will use the term 
“CPS” when naming all the similar documents. 
Table 1. Terminologies of CPS in Different Institutions.
Organization
(Country)
Terminology Period of 
Usage
ADB COSS (Country Operational Strategy Study) (1994~2001)
CSP (Country Strategy and Program) (2002~2011)
CPS (Country Partnership Strategy (2008~ )
WB CAS (Country Assistance Strategy) (1990~2014)
CPF (Country Partnership Framework) (2015~ )
U.S CDSS (Country Development Strategy 
Statement)
Unknown①
                                           
① This study could not confirm the period of usage from CIDC document.
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U.K CPR (Country Policy Review)
Korea CAS (Country Assistance Strategy) (2007~2010)
CPS (Country Partnership Strategy) (2010~ )
(ADB, 2009; WB, 2019; CIDC, 2007)
When it comes to country level, CPS means donor countries 
select priority partner countries and provide concentrated aids in 
core areas. Donor countries can be benefited from CPS by allocating 
their aid resources effectively (Kim et al. 2013). In the case of 
international ODA agencies, they do not select priority partner 
countries. Instead, international ODA agencies establish CPS for all 
the partner countries. 
The current form of CPS was created by WB in 1990. WB 
used the term CAS, which focused on the management of recipient 
countries from the perspective of donor rather than a reflection of 
the recipient country’s needs and priorities (Kim et al, 2013). 
ADB also established CPS under the name of COSS in 1994. CPS 
was not released to the public at that time but disclosed to the
public from 2000s. According to OECD (2009, 65), most DAC 
member countries were “preparing country strategies” under the 
bilateral consultation with the partner country government. 
CPS is important for the following reasons. First, CPS helps 
donor countries to suggest a concrete guideline for ODA and to 
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manage the implementation in a structured way. Second, CPS 
encourages the recipient country’s ownership of ODA because 
CPS allows the participation of recipient countries during the 
process of ODA. Ownership of the recipient country is more 
emphasized recently. Paris Declaration (2005) and Accra Agenda 
for Action (2008), milestone principles for the effective 
development cooperation, include the ownership as the first 
principle among their core principles (OECD, 2019). Third, CPS 
enables the consistent implementation of the ODA policy during the 
mid-and-long term period. Since CPS is a comprehensive 
framework for development cooperation in a country, it enhances 
the consistency within the donor country. In addition, CPS increases 
the consistency between the priorities of donor countries and those 
of donor countries. 






Developing countries set their own strategies for 
poverty reduction, improve their institutions and 
tackle corruption.




processes through wider participation in development 
policy formulation, stronger leadership on aid co-




2.1.4.2. The system of CPS
The system of CPS can be classified into three phases: 
selection of priority partner countries, operation of CPS, and 
evaluation of CPS. In the selection of priority partner countries, 
donor countries consider both qualitative and quantitative indicators 
to choose the most appropriate countries. As factors of recipient’s
sides, needs, governance, and aid experiences are considered. 
Meanwhile as factors of donor’s sides, objective of aid policy, 
economic and diplomatic relation, and harmonization of aid policy 
with other donor countries are considered (Kim. et al., 2013).
The number of priority partner countries are different in 
different countries. The smallest number is six in Portugal and the 
largest number is 75 in France. Mostly, donor countries select 15 to 
25 countries as priority partner countries. On average, the number 
of priority partner countries correspond to 19 % among all the 
recipient countries of each country (Kim. et al., 2013, 37). 
Once a donor country confirms priority partner countries, 
the donor country begins to establish CPS documents. A donor 
country prepares a draft considering the objectives, priorities, 
available resources, constraints, and obstacles of both donor and 
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partner countries. The consultation with partner countries occurs 
before and after the writing of the CPS documents. Next, CPS 
documents are adopted by a donor country and administered during 
the planned period. Typically, the period of CPS is from three to 
five years. The ODA policy in each country is implemented based 
on the CPS documents. Lastly, evaluation is conducted for the 
improvement of the ODA policy of a donor country (Kim. et al. 
2013). Donor countries will evaluate whether the ODA project has 
progressed well in accordance with the CPS and draw lessons from 
the implementation of ODA in priority partner countries. 
2.1.4.3. CPS in Korea
Korean government began to consider CPS in 2005. At the 
Cabinet meeting on November 15, 2005, Korean government 
adopted an agenda which included a plan to establish CPS with 
priority partner countries (third CIDC, 2008). However, the 
awareness of CPS seemed to be low in the government until 2007. 
In the Annual ODA Plan for 2006 (first CIDC, 2006), Korean 
government used the term “priority partner country” (first CIDC, 
2006), but that term did not mean a comprehensive strategy for 
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ODA, which includes plans for both a grant and a concessional loan. 
In the first CIDC agenda (2006), Korean government planned to 
select different priority partner countries for grants and 
concessional loans. Such a separation demonstrated that the ODA 
policy in Korea was established and implemented at the level of 
agency, not at the level of the country. The agenda of second CIDC 
(2007), which were named “Mid-term Strategy for 2008-2010”
demonstrated progressed awareness about CPS in Korean 
government. “Mid-term Strategy for 2008-2010” (second CIDC, 
2007) did not distinguish grants and concessional loans when it 
established CPS (then CAS). “Mid-term Strategy for 2008-2010”
included several elements of CPS, including policy dialogue, aid 
coordination, selection criteria, and three years of period. 
The plan for establishing CPS was more specified in the 
third CIDC. The third CIDC (2008) adopted “Mid-Term Country 
Assistance Strategy for 2008-2010” which included 18 priority 
partner countries, major instruments, priority sectors. However, 
“Mid-Term Country Assistance Strategy for 2008-2010” did 
not meet standards for CPS. In “Mid-Term Country Assistance 
Strategy for 2008-2010,” all 18 priority partner countries were 
introduced in one document. The needs and strategies for ODA 
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were written by regional categories, not by countries. Specific 
grounds for selecting key areas were not provided. Grants and 
concessional loans were still separated in the priority. There was 
no evidence that the policy dialogue with the partner country was 
conducted and reflected. 
In the seventh CIDC (2010), Korean government selected 
26 countries as priority partner countries by applying both 
qualitative and quantitative criteria (Table 3). 















(MOFA Research, 2013, 61)
Korean government also clarified specific principles for the 
establishment of CPS. Korean government decided to establish CPS 
under the consultation with priority partner countries and share the 
draft of CPS like the practice of other countries ② . Korean 
government decided to write an integrated form which includes both 
                                           
②
WB and ADB make the public CPS documents. United Kingdom and Japan 
disclose the draft of CPS.
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grants and concessional loans (7th CIDC, 2010). OECD DAC (2012, 
29) evaluated this movement as “the first template to attempt to 
integrate loans and grants and is a major improvement on the 
country assistance strategy format that preceded it.” Korean 
government planned to allocate more than 70% of bilateral ODA 
budget for priority partner countries. The proposed CPS 
establishment due was 2012. 
Korean government established the first CPS from 2011 to 
2013 for 26 priority partner countries. During the implementation of 
the first CPS, many problems were observed. According to the 
Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (2015), the selection 
process of priority partner countries was not rigorous, so great 
differentials were observed between priority partners in terms of 
ODA allocations. While four countries③ obtained 51.4% of bilateral 
ODA budget in Korea, however, nine countries④ only received 3.9% 
(BAI, 2015). OECD DAC (2012) indicated the following reviews: 
details for aid were not comprehensive; the expenditure plan was 
not provided; specific objects and plans were absent; measurable 
evaluation criteria were not defined. 
                                           
③ Vietnam(24%), Philippine(12.8%), Bangladesh(7.3%), Ethiopia(7.3%)
④
Nepal(0.8%), Uganda(0.7%), Bolivia(0.7%). East Timor(0.4%), Peru(0.4%), 
Paraguay(0.3%), Colombia(0.3%), Solomon Islands(0.2%), Nigeria(0.1%)
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In the second CPS, Korean government selected 24 priority 
partner countries in 2015. After the selection of the priority partner 
countries, OECD DAC recommended “the optimum number of 
priority partner countries to be less than 26” (OECD, 2012, 28), 
and Korean government accepted this recommendation (21th CIDC, 
2015). Korean government also considered many recommendations 
and advice, including specific objects, the predicted amount of aid in 
the process of establishing CPS (19th CIDC, 2014). However, the 
second CPS did not change much from the first CPS due to many 
constraints. The second CPS was established from 2015 to 2016 
and will be implemented four to five years.
Table 4. List of Priority Partner Countries.
Region First CPS (26) Second CPS (24)
Asia
(11)
Bangladesh, Cambodia, East Timor, 
Laos, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Philippine, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, 
Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, 




Cameroon, DR Congo, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Uganda
Ghana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 




Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru
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Middle East / 
CIS (2)





2.2.1. Researches on CPS in Korea
Many researches on CPS in Korea were conducted between 
2011 to 2017. Most of studies (Park. et al., 2013; Kim. et al., 2013; 
Kim, 2015; MOFA, 2013; Lee, 2017; Heo. et al., 2011; Jung, 2012, 
Kim & Nam, 2016) were conducted under direct or indirect support 
of the government. Only a few researches (Park. et al. 2017; Cha, 
2017; Lee, 2017) were conducted independently from the 
government. Such a result indicates that researches on CPS in 
Korea were mainly conducted by a practical purpose from 
bureaucrats and relevant research institutions. 
Subjects of each research on CPS in Korea are diverse. Park 
(2013), MOFA research (2013), and Kim & Nam (2016) focused on 
the selection of priority partner countries in the process of CPS. 
Park (2013) examined critical factors for the selection of priority 
partner countries in other countries. Park (2013) designed his own 
selection model and applied the model to a Korean case. Kim (2016) 
also analyzed the factors of determining priority partner countries. 
Kim (2016) adopted a regression analysis to test which factor 
24
played a more critical role in the selection of priority partner 
countries in Korea. According to Kim’s research (2016), 
bureaucratic factors were more influential than political factors in 
the selection process. MOFA research (2013) focused on 
describing the global trend of ODA and suggesting a desirable 
direction for the selection of priority partner counties. MOFA 
research suggested that Korean government should prioritize 
human security, enlightened national interest, and ownership of 
partner countries. 
Kim & Nam (2013) examined the operation of CPS in other 
countries: Spain, France, and New Zealand. Kim & Nam (2013) 
identified that how to operate CPS can be quite different in different 
countries. These three countries showed different governance, 
manuals, and procedures in the process of CPS (Kim & Nam, 2013). 
However, this research draws important lessons for the 
development of Korean CPS. Through the case analysis of other 
countries, Kim & Nam (2013) confirmed that the major principles of 
ODA, including ownership, consistency, transparency, mutual 
responsibility and predictability, are important in developing CPS. 
Kim (2015) focused on how to provide a technical guideline 
for the establishment of CPS. Kim (2015) analyzed the cases of the 
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U.K. and Sweden and provided the following recommendations: 
considering political factors and constraints, reflecting aid 
strategies and effectiveness, and promoting cooperation with 
diverse actors in partner countries.  
Park et al. (2017), Heo (2011), and Lee (2017)’s 
researches focus on  specific sectors of ODA. Park et al. (2017) 
identified some problems in the public administration sector of ODA 
and suggested alternative indicators for evaluation and specific 
priority cooperation areas for eight partner countries. Heo (2011) 
conducted this study for providing data for the establishment of CPS 
in the future. Heo (2011) collected agricultural data from six 
countries, which were exempted from the first CPS. Lee (2017) 
examined the demand for agricultural aid in Uzbekistan and 
suggested rigorous consideration of the unique backgrounds of CIS 
countries.
Researches regarding CPS in Korea are not affluent but deal 
with different aspects of CPS in Korea. However, there is no study 
conducted in the perspective of the policy process. Prior researches 
do not provide an appropriate explanation of why and how CPS was 
introduced in Korea. Researches from the perspective of the policy 
process have advantages in describing the holistic picture through 
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focusing on the actors, motivations, and mechanisms of social 
phenomenon. Although the prior researches did not deal with the 
policy process itself, such studies would be used in a 
complementary manner for analyzing the policy process, because 
they provide useful information about the policy process of CPS in 
Korea. For the rigorous analysis about the policy process of CPS in 
Korea, this study will analyze policy transfer studies, government 
documents, documents of international ODA agencies, and other 
relevant researches.
2.2.2. Researches on Policy Transfer
Although some problems are unique in one country, more 
problems which draw attention from most individuals to the 
government are common in many countries (Rose, 1991). These 
issues include “education, social security, health care … and a 
buoyant economy” (Ibid., 4). The confrontation of such common 
problems encourages policy-makers to learn from their 
counterparts for a better solution regarding these problems (Ibid). 
Researches on policy transfer begin from this recognition. The term 
which indicates above phenomenon is diverse by researchers. 
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Bandwagoning (Ikenberry, 1990), lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991), 
policy diffusion (Majone, 1991), policy convergence (Bennett, 
1991), social learning (Hall, 1993), and emulation (Howlett, 2000) 
are used to indicate the similar process. In this study, I will use 
“policy transfer” when indicating those phenomena. Dolowitz and 
Marsh (1996) introduced the term of “policy transfer” and 
argued that those terms refer to “a process in which knowledge 
about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one 
time and/or place is used in the development of policies, 
administrative arrangements, and institutions in another time and/or 
place” (p.344). 
Most of researches on policy transfer focus on why and how 
policies are transferred. However, there are nuanced differences 
between researches on policy transfer. Diffusion studies (Rogers, 
1962; Majone, 1991) focused on how communication among  
neighboring countries results in similarities in policies (Dolowitz, 
2017). Rogers (1962) argued that the diffusion process follows S-
curve which includes slow diffusion in the initial period, bandwagon 
in the next period, and saturation in the final period. Although 
diffusion studies contributed to explain the spread of innovations 
and the development of technology in European countries, it had the 
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following limitations: diffusion studies ignored the possibility of 
unconscious learning, the adaptation process which determines 
policy success, the role of personalities, ideologies, and politics in 
policy transfer (Dolowitz, 2017). 
Lesson-drawing studies (Bennett, 1991a; Wolman, 1992) 
also paid attention to how policy transfer occurs. However, lesson 
drawing studies tried to explain the reason of policy transfer, and 
they suggested rationality as a major factor of policy transfer 
(Dolowitz, 2017). While the diffusion studies focused on the pattern 
of policy transfer, lesson drawing studies tried to explain the 
driving factor of policy transfer. Although lesson-drawing studies 
raised other aspects of policy transfer, they also have similar 
limitations with diffusion studies. Lesson-drawing studies also 
focused on the voluntary process. They did not pay much attention 
to the adaptation process, which could be a critical factor for policy 
failure (Ibid). 
Policy transfer studies (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2000; 
Evans, 2004; Fawcett & Marsh, 2012; Dolowitz, 2017) tried to 
explain all similar situations of policy transfer. Dolowitz (1996) 
argued that the term “policy transfer” is more appropriate than 
other terms in describing both voluntary and coercive transfer. 
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Policy transfer studies also provided a framework for the organized 
examination of the policy transfer process. Dolowitz (1996, 2000) 
raised the following questions regarding policy transfer: Why 
transfer? Who is involved in transfer? What is transferred? From 
where? Degree of transfer, constraints on transfer, how to 
demonstrate transfer? How transfer leads to policy failure? Such 
questions provide a clear guideline for the research of policy 
transfer. Evans (2004) provided a simpler framework with Dolowitz 
& Marsh’s studies (2000). Evans provided three areas for the 
policy transfer process. 
Table 5. Three Areas of Policy Transfer Analysis.
Description How policy transfer is made?
Explanation Why policy transfer occurs?
Prescription How policy transfer should be made?
(Evans, 2004, 13)
Compared to previous studies, transfer studies mainly focus 
on conditions of policy transfer, thus, they can explain more details 
about “the process of movement, development, and implementation”
(Dolowitz, 2017). Transfer studies has been adopted to examine 
many topics, including social policy, crime, public education, 
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development assistance, urban planning, and environmental issues 
(Benson & Jordan, 2011). Transfer studies also focus on the 
constraints and conditions for policy success. Dolowitz & Marsh 
(2000) suggested three factors of the policy failure: uninformed 
transfer, incomplete transfer, and inappropriate transfer. Fawcett & 
Marsh (2012) examined a procurement system (Gateway Review 
process) which transferred from the U.K. to Australia in order to 
assess how these three factors influenced policy success. These 
transfer studies also have limitations. Although transfer theories 
included coercive transfer as a type of policy transfer, most of the 
studies examined voluntary cases. Transfer studies also neglected 
politics, ideologies, and tacit beliefs (Dolowitz, 2017).
Although transfer studies still actively conducted in many 
countries, recently, many researchers focus on the translations in 
the policy process. (Dolowitz, 2017). These studies (Clark et al., 
2015, Peck & Theodore, 2015) also emphasize that policies in one 
country actively transferred to other countries. Clark et al. (2015, 1) 
argued policy “moves from place to place.” Theodore (2015, 2) 
claimed that “Learning from and referencing distant model and 
practice is now commonplace.” However, these studies focus on 
how policies transformed in the process of implementation in a new 
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institution. Translation studies try to understand how the system of 
the recipient institution influence the adaptation of imported policy 
and how it implemented in a new institution (Dolowitz, 2017). 
Researches regarding policy transfer provide rich insights 
for analyzing the policy transfer cases. Among these researches, 
transfer studies seem to provide the most comprehensive 
perspectives. They include both voluntary and coercive transfers. 
They provide organized framework for follow-up studies. 
Additionally, they provide prescriptive insights for the success of 
policy transfer. Since recent researches regarding translations raise 
the issues of implementation, such aspects need to be considered 
when the government adopt new policy from other countries.    
2.3. Research Questions and Analytical Framework
The object of this study is to examine the policy process of 
CPS in Korea and provide implications for the successful 
implementation of the policy. In order to achieve such objectives, 
this study will adopt analytical frames of policy transfer studies. 
Research questions will be reconstructed following the analytical 
framework. 
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Among policy transfer studies, Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 
2000) provided a clear and the most comprehensive framework for 
the analysis of policy transfer, so this study will follow Dolowitz & 
Marsh’s framework and answer research questions of this 
framework. Evans (2004) also provided straightforward and 
comprehensive frames for the analysis of the policy transfer. Evans 
(2004) suggested objectives and contents of transfer studies. Thus, 
this study will use a framework which combines the frameworks 
from Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000) and Evans (2004). Research 
objectives are description, explanation, and prescription of CPS in 
Korea. There are three major research questions and seven 
detailed research questions (Table 6) Three major research 
questions are: How is policy transfer made? Why does policy 
transfer occur? How should policy transfer be made? These three 
research questions include all research questions in Dolowitz and 
Marsh’s study (2000) except how to demonstrate policy transfer. 
Since this question is related to the research methodology rather 
than a research question, I exclude this question from the analytical 
framework. This study will demonstrate the policy transfer by 
utilizing documents from Korean government, OECD DAC, and 
relevant researches regarding CPS in Korea. The studies on policy 
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transfer and other studies on ODA and CPS will be used for further 
understanding of the context of policy transfer in Korea. 
Most of Dolowitz & Marsh’s research questions can be 
included in the first research question of Evans (2004). The main 
purpose of policy transfer theory is to describe the policy transfer 
phenomenon. However, this study will deal with the other two 
purposes, explanation and prescription, with similar weight for the 
practical use of the study. 
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Evans(2004) Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000)
Description How is policy 
transfer made?
Who were involved in transfer?
(Elected officials, Bureaucrats, Civil 
servants, Institutions, Ideologies, 
Attitudes/Cultural Values, Consultants, 




(Policies(Goals, Contents, Instruments), 
Programs)
From where?(Past, Within a Nation, 
Cross National)
Degrees of transfer
(Copying, Emulation, Mixture, 
Inspiration)
Constraints on transfer
(Policy Complexity, Past Policies, 
Structural Institutional Feasibility)





Prescription How should 
policy transfer 
be made?
How transfer lead to policy failure?
(Uninformed Transfer, Incomplete 
Transfer, Inappropriate Transfer)
(reconstructed from Evans (2004, 13) & Dolowitz & Marsh (2000, 
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9))
Chapter 3. Country Partnership Strategy in 
Korea and Policy Transfer
3.1. Why CPS was Transferred in Korea?
A transfer can occur for many reasons. Many scholars 
demonstrated various reasons of policy transfer: political purpose 
(Robertson, 1991), dissatisfaction (Rose, 1991), enforcement of 
international organizations (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996), externalities 
(Hoberg, 1991), technology (Bennett, 1992), and the emergence of 
international consensus (Ibid). Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) believed 
these factors could be located in the continuum between voluntary 
and coercive transfer. While Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) introduced 
voluntary and coercive transfer, they admitted that “at the margin, 
two types merge” (p. 346). They further developed this 
continuum in 2000 as follows (Table 7). Evans (2009) also 
introduced diverse factors raised by other scholars: ideational 
discourse (Ladi, 2005), the activities of global economic institutions 
(Stiglitz, 2002), the institution and processes of Europeanization 
(Buller et al, 2002), international treaties such as GATT ⑤ and 
                                           
⑤ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
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NAFTA⑥ (Stone, 2000), and transnational and non-governmental 
organizations (Ibid). 
Table 7. Why Transfer? Continuum.
Types Details
Voluntary Lesson drawing (Perfect Rationality)
Mixtures Lesson drawing (Bounded Rationality)
International Pressures (Image, Consensus, Perceptions)
Externalities, Obligation
Conditionality (Loans, Constitutions, Attached to Business 
Activity)
Coercive Direct Imposition, Pressure Groups
Political Parties, Policy Entrepreneurs / Experts
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 9)
To determine which type the transfer of CPS in Korea is, we 
need to examine the definitions and cases of both voluntary transfer 
and coercive transfer. 
At first, we will examine cases of voluntary transfer. 
Voluntary transfer assumes that policy-makers make rational 
decisions. According to the classic model of policy-making, policy-
makers have complete information and identify all alternatives to 
make the most reasonable decision. When policy-makers search a 
solution for a problem, cases of other countries can be considered 
                                           
⑥ North American Free Trade Area
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as a reference. If some policies are successfully implemented in 
another country, both policy-makers and voters may adopt those 
policies as reasonable and acceptable alternatives. 
However, it is not common that policy-makers adopt one 
policy based on perfect rationality. In reality, policy-makers 
experience limited ability and resources, time constraints, and 
complex political conditions. Policy decisions are often made by 
perceived awareness rather than through awareness of reality, and 
policy transfer takes place in a combined form. 
Nevertheless, scholars studied the cases of voluntary 
transfer. The most common driving forces of voluntary transfer is 
dissatisfaction with the status quo (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). A 
voluntary transfer can occur when politicians want to justify 
preferred positions (Bennett, 1991). The spread of privatization can 
be an example which supports this perspective. The voluntary 
transfer can also occur when some institutions encountered 
uncertainty (Hass, 1989). 
Before Korean government received a guideline regarding 
CPS, Korean government already perceived a need of CPS. 
As ODA increases, effective program implementation 
system need to be enhanced through increasing policy coordination 
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and integration. (Korean government) need to establish a strategic 
plan which integrates grants and concessional loans in order to
increase the connection between tools and coordination. (CIDC, 
2006, 2)
Due to the lack of country assistance strategy, it is difficult 
to implement a strategic and consistent aid policy. Currently, MOEF 
and MOFA select their own priority countries and carry their 
program separately. The connection between aid tools and agencies 
are not close. Aid resources are not managed effectively due to the 
redundant allocation of budget. (CIDC, 2008, 2)
Taking above statements into consideration, it was evident 
that the Korean government showed dissatisfaction in its ODA 
practice. Meanwhile, political preferences and perception of 
uncertainties are not found in CIDC documents. In summary, there 
was an element of voluntary transfer in the process of CPS in Korea. 
Additionally, we will examine whether there is a coercive 
element in the introduction of CPS. The simplest case of coercive 
transfer is the case that one country forces another country to 
adopt its policy. However, the occurrence of such direct imposition 
is not common (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Sometimes, technology 
played a role as a coercive factor for policy transfer. The U.K. had 
to adopt the international agreement about data communication in 
order to be not lag behind in the international trend (Bennett, 
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1991b). Corporations can exert a coercive by utilizing their capital 
power (Ibid). Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) argued that supra-national 
institutions are key sources for coercive policy transfer. For 
instance, the IMF requires countries to adopt specific policies when 
it provides loans.
Among diverse factors of coercive elements, the influence of 
supra-national organizations is the most relevant to the case of 
CPS in Korea. In the case of Korea, establishing CPS was related to 
obtaining the membership of OECD DAC. Korean government 
planned to obtain the membership of OECD DAC in 2005 (CIDC, 
2007). The objectives of obtaining the membership were: to 
improve the international status, to increase the effectiveness of aid 
policy, and to obtain more public support for ODA. In 2006, Korean 
government declared to pursue the membership of OECD DAC 
(MOFA, 2006). In 2007, Korean government examined detailed 
conditions and procedures for the membership of OECD DAC. 
Table 8. Requirements for the Membership of OECD DAC. 
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1) Appropriate organization, strategy, policies.
2) Appropriate amount of aid (more than 100 million USD or 0.2% 
of ODA/GNI ratio)
3) Monitoring/evaluation system for aid programs
4) Promise for fulfillment: 
- speedy fulfillment of DAC recommendations
- submission of annual statistic data
- participation in DAC conference and executive group 
meeting
- submission of annual report for ODA
- examination of peer review
At the time, Korean government did not clearly recognize 
that OECD DAC required its members to establish CPS, so there 
was no specific plan for CPS. However, OECD DAC recommended 
establishing CPS in its special examination in 2008. It was evident 
that Korean government had to establish CPS in order to obtain the 
membership of OECD DAC (fifth CIDC, 2009). Korean government 
accepted these requirements. As a result, plan for establishing CPS 
were specified in the fifth CIDC document (2009). However, this 
process did not demonstrate that the policy transfer in Korea was a 
coercive one. A country still have “a degree of freedom to choose 
the version of economic policy best suited to their situation”
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 11), even though it largely depends on 
critical resources. In this sense, inter-governmental organizations 
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(IGOs) are “agents of voluntary transfer” while they are acting 
as “agent of coercive transfer.” The degree of coerciveness can 
be determined whether the IGOs exercise direct policy or indirect 
policy. Loan conditions are typical examples of the direct 
instrument while the information and policies in conferences and 
reports are examples of indirect instruments. OECD usually 
exercises indirect instruments such as conferences and reports as 
main instruments. Thus, the adoption of CPS in Korea had an 
element of coercive factors, but it was not strong. Korean 
government still had a degree of freedom but decided to follow the 
requirements of OECD DAC for the interest of Korean government. 
The motivation of CPS in Korea looked seemingly coercive 
because OECD DAC strongly recommended it. Korean government 
had to establish CPS to obtain the membership of OECD DAC. 
However, Korean government were willing to improve its aid policy 
through learning the cases of other countries. In addition, Korean 
government still had a degree of freedom in establishing CPS in its 
way. Taking these factors into consideration, the adoption of CPS 
policy in Korea seems to have both voluntary factor and coercive 
factor. To be specific, voluntary factor seems to be more prevalent 
than coercive factor because the degree of coerciveness was not 
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strong as the case of loan conditions. 
3.2. How was CPS Transferred in Korea?
3.2.1. Main actors of Policy Transfer
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 345) identified six categories of 
actors in policy transfer: elected officials, political parties, 
bureaucrats / civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs
/ experts, and supra-national organizations. Among these actors, 
bureaucrats and supra-national organization (here OECD) seems to 
play a critical role in the formulation of CPS in Korea. In short, the 
interaction between public officials in Korean government and 
bureaucrats in OECD DAC resulted in the formulation of CPS in 
Korea.
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Evidence is found both in the documents of the Korean 
government and other organizations. In 2008, OECD DAC conducted 
a special examination on an ODA policy in Korea. At the time, Korea 
tried to obtain the membership of OECD DAC for effective 
implementation of the ODA policy (second CIDC, 2007). OECD DAC 
provided several recommendations to Korea. 
Table 9. OECD DAC Recommendation (2008). (fifth CICD, 7)
While referencing the recommendations of OECD DAC, 
Korean government planned to select integrated priority partner 
countries and established CPS from 2011, which indicated that the 
OECD DAC played an vital role to make Korean government adopt 
CPS. Many pieces of literatures about policy transfer focus on the 
role of supra-national organizations. Rose (1993) argued: “The 
European Community and OECD encourage exchanges among 
advanced industrial nations. … the World Bank and the United 
Nations agencies focus on programs of concern to developing 
countries” (p.105). Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) stated: 
Ø Establishment of effective mid-term aid strategy 
Ø Selection of integrated priority partner country
Ø Establishment of integrated Country Partnership Strategy (CPS)
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“International organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, … enforce 
similar policies across diverse countries ” (p.7). OECD DAC also 
exercises strong influences by utilizing peer reviews and 
conferences. In addition, the reports of OECD DAC are widely 
referenced by other ODA organizations for the assessment of ODA 
policy of certain country. Taking these points into account, the role 
of OECD DAC in the formulation of CPS in Korea can be considered 
as an ordinary process, which can be frequently observed in 
policy-making processes in Korea. 
Regarding the actors of CPS in Korea, bureaucrats in Korean 
government seemed to the only significant actor in the process of 
CPS. The chairman of ODA Watch argued that CPS policy were 
formulated in the absence of participation of experts and relevant 
parties and that the information was not disclosed to citizens (45th 
ODA talk, 2014). This criticism was supported by the fact that 
Korean government did not open the list of priority partner 
countries for the first CPS until 2012. Priority partner countries for 
the first CPS was decided in 2010 but did not announce the list to 
the public (seventh CIDC, 2010). Korean government explained that 
disclosing the list of priority partner countries may cause a 
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diplomatic problem (PMO, 2012). This shows that there are not 
many opportunities for other actors except bureaucrats to 
participate in the formulation of CPS in Korea. Due to the similar 
reason, most of researches about CPS were conducted by 
government-related individuals and agencies after the 
establishment of the first CPS.
3.2.2. Objects of Policy Transfer
The objects of policy transfer refer to what are transferred. 
Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) stated that several objects can be 
transferred during the policy transfer, which include: goals, 
structure and content, instruments or administrative techniques, 
institutions, ideology, ideas, attitudes and concepts, and negative 
lessons. Among these elements, this study will concentrate on 
content considering the availability of evidence. Regarding CPS in 
Korea, OECD DAC (2008) provided two specific recommendations: 
selecting priority partner countries and establishing integrated CPS. 
The recommendations of OECD DAC are related to the content of 
policy transfer. Korean government selected 26 priority partner 
countries in 2010 and established the first CPS until 2013. 
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Although OECD DAC plays as a critical role in the policy 
transfer, OECD DAC does not establish CPS. The workgroup of 
OECD DAC observes the cases of international ODA agencies and 
developed countries and it provides a recommendation based on its 
observations. Thus, cases of some developed countries were
examined for analysis. Documents of CIDC provide the information 
for comparison. 
In the agenda of the third CIDC, Korean government 
provided a result of case study on the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, 
and Japan. The result of the case study included the following 
information: a source of information for the writing of CPS 
documents, communication methods with partner countries, the 
term of CPS documents, the number of priority partner countries, 
and CPS governance in the donor countries. These case studies 
acted as a ground for the contents of CPS in Korea. In the 
“Establishment of Country Partnership Strategies for 2012”
(12th CIDC, 2012), most of the elements which were included in 
the case studies were reflected. 
Table 10. Comparison of Case study and CPS Plan in Korea.
Features (CIDC, 2008) Adoption in Korea (CIDC, 2012)
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U.S USAID local branch collects 
information.
Embassy, local branch of ODA 
agency collect information.
Government utilizes policy 
dialogues.
Conduct conference of policy
CPS documents are updated 
every 5 years.
3~5 years period
U.K. U.K. has 18 priority partner
countries.
26 priority partner countries
Macro-economic situation, 
development policy, and 
bilateral relationships are 
considered when determining 
priority area.
Macro-economic situation, 
development policy, and aid 
record are considered when 
determining priority area.
Germany Government utilizes policy 
dialogues.
Conduct conference of policy
Government detaches research 
group.
Embassy, local branch of ODA 
agency collect information.
France Committee of ODA selects 54 
priority partner countries and 
establishes CPS
ODA governance establish CPS 
for 26 priority partner countries 
until 2013
Japan ODA Agency (JIKA) establish 
CPS. 
ODA governance establish CPS
Government conduct a research 
about 25 priority partner 
countries.
Embassy, local branch of ODA 
agency collect information.
Although the case study of Korean government may have 
some biases, documents of CIDC (2008, 2012) indicates that 
Korean government attempted to contain all elements of CPS of 
developed countries. Both the documents demonstrated that many 
elements of CPS were transferred from developed countries. In 
particular, the consultation with partner countries, the method for 
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collecting data, the period, considerations for selecting priority 
areas, and the number of priority partner countries seemed to be 
learned from cases of foreign countries. 
3.2.3. Origins of the Policy
Origins of the policy refers to “from where are lessons 
drawn?” Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000) demonstrated various 
origins of policy: experience, different branches and divisions, other 
political systems within their own country, other nations, and 
international organizations. 
In the case of CPS in Korea, cases of other nations are
identified as a source of the policy. Cases of other advanced 
countries, such as the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, and Japan, were 
studied for the formulation of CPS in Korea. 
Although the CPS was introduced from international ODA 
agencies including WB and ADB, their cases of CPS were not 
utilized as a ground for the CPS policy in Korea. There are no clear 
explanations of this issue. However, Korean government might 
think that international organizations are not the comparable to the 
government. In this regard, the international organizations can be a 
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driving force of a specific policy. For example, OECD DAC 
recommend Korean government to adopt CPS policy, but OECD 
DAC has limitations to become origins for lesson drawing. 
International organizations and countries have different operating 
systems. For example, WB and ADB do not select priority partner 
countries. Thus, bureaucrats of Korean government learned cases 
of other developed countries for benchmarking. 
3.2.4. Degree of Transfer
The degree of transfer refers to how many changes are 
observed in a transferred policy. Rose (1993) proposed five 
categories, while Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000) utilized four 
categories. Since Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000)’s categories are 
grounded on Rose’s study (1993)⑦, we will use Rose’s frame to 
analyze the establishment of CPS in Korea. 
Table 11. Degrees of Transfer (original: Alternative Ways of Drawing 
Lesson).
                                           
⑦
Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) just combined “hybridization” and “synthesis”
and expressed it “Mixture” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 9). Dolowitz & Marsh 
(1996) did not explain the reason for merging two concepts. They just 
stated “We prefer to combine the two related categories of hybridization 
and synthesis” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 351).
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Copying Adoption, more or less intact of a programme already in 
effect in another jurisdiction
Emulation Adoption, with adjustment for different circumstances, or a 
programme already in effect in another jurisdiction 
Hybridization Combine elements of programmes from two different 
places
Synthesis Combine familiar elements from programmes in effect in 
three or more different places
Inspiration Programmes elsewhere used as intellectual stimulus for 
developing a novel programme without analogue elsewhere
(Rose, 1993, 22)
In accordance with Rose’s categories (1993), the 
formulation of CPS in Korea seems to close to synthesis. CIDC 
documents regarding CPS in Korea referencing many countries. In 
two CIDC documents, which dealt with the CPS issue, Korean 
government introduced or referenced the case of other countries. In 
the 2008 document, Korean government introduced the summary of 
case studies. In the 2014 document, Korean government utilized the 
study on oversea cases to support some directions or provide 
implications, which means that Korean government did not copy the 
case of one single country. Instead, Korean government tried to 
combine many elements of different countries in formulating CPS. 
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Table 12. Referenced Countries in CIDC.




Assistance Strategy for 
2008~2010
U.S., U.K. Germany, France, Japan
19th CIDC 
(2014)
Guideline for the 
Establishment of Country 
Partnership Strategies
Japan, U.S., Ireland, Australia, U.K. 
The adoption of CPS seems to be more than the degree of 
inspiration. The awareness of Korean government about CPS had 
been low before CPS transferred from other countries, so the 
foreign cases acted more than intellectual stimulus. Until 2007, 
Korean government did not have a specific plan for the 
establishment of CPS. The 2007 CIDC document only deals with the 
needs for the establishment of CPS and expressed the need for the 
selection of priority partner countries. In 2008, Korean government 
established “nominal” CPS for 2008~2010, but this document 
could not meet the qualifications of CPS. It was not an integrated 
strategy which dealt with both grants and concessional loans. In 
addition, all priority partner countries were shortly introduced in 
one document, so this nominal CPS document could not be shared or 
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discussed with partner countries. In 2010, Korean government 
eventually identified that the CPS should be established in an 
integrated way and written under close consultation with partner 
countries. Meanwhile, Korean government also learned that CPS 
documents are usually released to the public. Korean bureaucrats 
learned these lessons from the feedback from OECD DAC. 
3.2.5. Constraints of Transfer
Constraints of Transfer refers to how hard the transfer is. 
According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), “the more complex a 
policy or programme is, the harder it will be to transfer” (353). 
This explanation is intuitive, but in order to make the examination 
more systematic, we need more specific frames regarding the 
constraints of CPS. I reorganized a framework based on Dolowitz & 
Marsh’s study (1996). The following questions were selected 
based on the availability of evidence and the affluence of discussion 
in Dolowitz and Marsh’s study (1996). For example, there are not 
much evidence to examine the political system, ideologies, and the 
cost of implementation. The effect of the past policy was not 
apparent in Dolowitz and Marsh’s study.
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Table 13. Questions regarding Constraints of CPS.
1. Was the goal of CPS clear?
2. Are significant side effects perceived in CPS?
3. Was there many information?
4. Was the ODA governance in Korea effective?
Goal 
The goal of CPS seems to be clear in Korea. Regarding CPS, 
Korean government used consistent expressions from 2007 to 2010. 
It is evident that Korean government considered CPS as a tool to 
enhance the effectiveness of aid policy through concentration. 
Meanwhile, IGOs emphasized the engagement of partner countries. 
Kim et al. (2013) argued that the purpose of CPS is to establish 
performance-based aid system and promote the active participation 
of partner countries. Although Korean government did not show a 
balanced recognition compared to IGOs regarding CPS, Korean 
government had a clear and consistent goal at the time. 
Table 14. Expressions regarding the Goal of CPS.
Time Expressions in CIDC documents Expressions in other 
sources
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2007 Strategic, comprehensive aid




Engage with developing 
member country (ADB, 
2009)




and focused (WB, 2019)
2008 Concentration strategy
Effective implementation of aid 
resources
Enhancement of aid effectiveness
2009 Strengthen performance-based 
aid system 
2010 Effective utilization of limited 
resources through concentration 
strategy
Side effects
Significant side effects were not perceived in the 
formulation of CPS. Korean government consistently identified the 
need to establish CPS for an effective ODA policy in Korea without 
stating any side-effects. Since CPS is a strategy to enhance the 
effectiveness of aid policy, only implementing CPS will not have a 
significant side-effect. One concern was that Korean government 
worried about the diplomatic effect of disclosing the list of priority 
partner countries. After Korean government rejected to publish the 
list of priority partner countries, Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) of 
Korea argued that releasing the list may damage the interest of the 
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government (PMO, 2012). Korean government concerned complains 
from other countries that were excluded from priority partner 
countries (Ibid), which explained the reason why Korean 
government did not release the list of priority partner countries. 
However, Korean government eventually released the list of 26 
priority partner countries at the same year. PMO explained that 
Korean government considered consistent requests of domestic 
civil society and opinions of relevant ministries. This change of 
attitude in a short time showed that the concern regarding 
disclosing the list of priority partner countries was not significant to 
prevent the formulation of CPS. 
Information
Information regarding CPS seems to be affluent when 
Korean government formulates CPS. First, most of developed 
countries operate CPS (OECD, 2009). Korean government identified 
this practice in 2008. At the time, Korean government argued: 
“most of the advanced donor countries, including DAC member 
countries select priority partner countries, and establish CPS”
(third CIDC, 2008, p.2). In addition, Korean government conducted 
case studies of the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, and Japan (Ibid). 
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Second, international ODA agencies, including WB and ADB, 
provided a guideline for CPS before Korean government formulated 
CPS. ADB (2007) provided much detailed information regarding 
CPS, including purpose, principles, frequency, meetings, results 
framework, and reviews. WB and ADB have been releasing CPS 
documents from the early 2000s. 
Governance
ODA governance in Korea seemed to be a critical constraint 
when Korean government established the CPS. Korean government 
provides two types of aid: grants and concessional loans. Each type 
of aid managed by different ministries. 
Figure 1: Structure of ODA governance in Korea (ODAKOREA, 
2019)
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Grants are managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) while concessional loans are managed by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (MOEF). Each ministry controls aid agencies: 
MOFA controls KOICA, and MOEF controls Korea Export-Import
(EXIM) bank.
Many documents demonstrates the segmentation of two 
areas. The special examination of OECD DAC (2008) recommended 
the selection of integrated priority partner countries and the 
establishment of integrated Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 
(CIDC 2009). BAI (2015) indicated that MOEF and MOFA selected 
their own priority partner countries until 2010. However, CIDC, 
which is the committee of ODA governance in Korea, attempted to 
58
overcome the segregation. 
Table 15. The Expressions Which Emphasizes Integrated Effort.
Time Expression
2008 It is hard to implement strategic and consistent aid policy due 
to unintegrated country assistance strategy (p.2).
2009 It is needed to establish integrated country assistance strategy 
for the performance based aid system (p.7).
2010 Korean government will integrate priority partner countries, 
which separately operated so far and will concentrate more 
than 70% of bilateral aid to 26 priority partner countries (p.18)
Korean government will establish CAS in an integrated way 
until 2012 (p.19).
In many CIDC documents, Korean government emphasized 
the importance of integrated effort in establishing CPS. 
OECD DAC (2012) also evaluated this effort positively. 
Korea’s latest country partnership strategies (CPS), which 
integrate grants and loans, identify only two or three focus sectors 
for each priority partner country. This is a welcome departure from 
Korea’s previous practice, in which its assistance was spread 
across more sectors in each of its partner countries. The new 
approach provides opportunities for loans and grants to support the 
same sectors. (OECD Peer Review, 2012, 27)
To conclude, the segregation of ODA governance attributed 
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to the delay of the implementation of CPS, but owing to the active 
effort of CIDC, Korean government overcame the constraints of the 
transfer. 
Chapter 4. Evaluation of Policy Transfer of the CPS
In the process of policy transfer, policy-makers expect that 
their policy leads to policy success, however, this is not always the 
case. A program which has produced desirable results in one 
country may result in policy failure in another country (Rose, 1991), 
which means that policy-makers need to consider the outcomes of 
policy transfer for the success of the adopted policy. However, 
there were little researches focusing the relationship between 
policy transfer and policy outcomes (Fawcett & Marsh, 2012).
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Examining the relationship between policy transfer and policy 
outcomes has aspects of both explanation and prescription. If we 
can explain the reason why some policies are successful or why 
some policies ends in failure in another setting, we are able to 
provide effective solutions to the learner of the policy. 
Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) claims that policy transfer 
theories need to provide an insight into the relationship of policy 
transfer and policy outcomes. In particular, they examined which 
factors are related to policy failure, and argued that “at least three 
factors have significant effects on policy transfer”: uninformed, 
incomplete and inappropriate transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 17).




The borrowing country may have insufficient information 
about the policy/institution and how it operates in the 
country from which it is transferred.
Incomplete 
Transfer
Crucial elements of what made the policy or institutional 




Insufficient attention may be paid to the differences 
between the economic, social, political and ideological 
contexts in the transferring and the borrowing country.
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 17)
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In order to apply Dolowitz & Marsh’s frame which deals 
with the factors of policy failure (2000), we need to access whether 
CPS in Korea is success or failure. However, the criteria to tell 
whether CPS is a success or failure is not clear. Fawcett and Marsh 
(2012) suggested two types of approach: a process dimension and 
a programmatic dimension. According to Fawcett & Marsh, policy 
transfer might be a success in terms of the process dimension but 
might be a failure in terms of the programmatic dimension. In this 
sense, we will discuss both aspects of success when we evaluate/ 
examine the outcome of policy transfer. 
Table 17. Two Dimensions of Policy Success. 
Dimension Focus Evidence
Process Was the transfer 
successful in the sense 
that the process was 
accomplished with few 
problems?
The number of institutions 
which imported the same 
policy,
Public belief,
Combined support of 
politicians and bureaucrats
Programmatic Was the transferred policy, 
once introduced into the 
new jurisdiction, 
successful in achieving its 
objectives?
Saving of money,
Reports of independent audit 
office,




(Processed from Fawcett & Marsh, 2012, 165; 170)
Then, there is an issue of how to search the evidence of 
success or failure. Some changes of indicators or evaluations of 
relevant documents might be provided as evidence of policy 
success or failure. Fawcett and Marsh’s study (2012) used five 
main data sources to evaluate policy outcomes: government 
literature, reviews of auditing office, media coverage, published 
literature, and interviews of key policy actors. Similarly, I will 
utilize the government documents in CIDC and BAI, Peer reviews of 
OECD, and NGO’s opinion regarding CPS. 
4.1. Progress Dimension
Korean government specified the due of the establishment of 
first CPSs to 2012 (CIDC, 2010). Korean government formed a task 
force in which PMO, MOEF, MOFA, KoreaExim Bank, and KOICA⑧
were included for the establishment of CPS. In this process, PMO 
acted as a facilitator which initially established one CPS document 
                                           
⑧
KoreaExim Bank and KOICA support and implement the ODA policy under 
the supervision of MOEF and MOFA respectively. 
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of one country as a model. Although the process has delayed for 
one year, Korean government completed the establishment of first 
CPS. 
Table 18. Times for the Establishment of the First CPS
Year Countries
2011 (3) Vietnam, Ghana, Solomon Islands
2012 (11) Bolivia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, 
Ethiopia, DR Congo, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Philippine, 
Uzbekistan
2013 (12) Laos, Mozambique, Peru, Cameroon, Colombia, Nigeria, 
Nepal, East Timor, Rwanda, Uganda, Paraguay, Pakistan
(ODAKOREA, 2019)
Korea also met the requirement of OECD DAC’s
recommendation which specified the selection of integrated priority 
partner countries and the establishment of integrated CPS 
documents. OECD DAC evaluated Korean government’s effort in 
its 2012 peer review. 
Korea’s latest country partnership strategies (CPS), which 
integrate grants and loans, identify only two or three focus sectors 
for each priority partner country. This is a welcome departure from 
Korea’s previous practice, in which its assistance was spread 
across more sectors in each of its partner countries.
(OECD Peer Review, 2012, 27)
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The introduction of country partnership strategies (CPS) 
that, for the first time, bring together Korea’s grants and loans 
into one document. (Ibid, 63)
Kim (2013) also assessed that “the PMO’s guideline of 
CPS document, the decision for the fulfillment, transparency, and 
enhancement of communication with partner countries are similar 
with other countries so seems to be positive” (p.7). 
However, the positive evaluation did not mean that there 
were no problems in process dimension. Many problems were 
raised regarding the process of CPS in Korea. CIDC (2012) 
specified problems which the government encountered in the 
process of CPS: difficulties in coordination with relevant countries, 
an insufficient reflection of relevant ministries’ opinion, and 
difficulties in policy dialogue with partner countries due to the time 
constraint, conflicts of schedule among delegates (p.30). BAI (2015) 
indicated that some priority partner countries were not targets of 
concessional loans and that some key elements were absent in CPS 
documents. ODA Watch (2014) criticized that the government 
monopolized the process of CPS. OECD DAC raised a similar 
problem in its 2018 peer review. 
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Overall, without ensuring government plans have been 
subject to broader multi-stakeholder consultation, Korea risks 
supporting projects within the framework of the CPS that give 
inadequate attention to context, sustainable development results 
and recurrent costs (OECD DAC Peer Review, 2018, 117).
Korean government formulated the similar appearance of 
CPS with that of advanced donor countries, but many problems 
were raised in the process of CPS. However, most of these 
problems were related to technical problems, which might be 
addressed in the future. Kim (2013) also expressed that measures
for addressing problems of CPS, such as the incompleteness of CPS 
documents and insufficient communication with partner countries, 
should be “complemented” in the future (p.7). Thus, measures 
for the completeness of policy transfer need to be implemented for 
the success of CPS. Overall, the CPS in Korea is close to a success 
in terms of progress but has many minor issues to be addressed. 
4.2. Programmatic Dimension
Assessing the policy outcomes in a programmatic dimension 
begins with identifying the objects of the policy. In the case of CPS, 
the effectiveness of the ODA policy is the most important object. 
Although IGOs suggests that the participation and ownership of 
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recipient countries are also major objects, it ultimately aims the 
effectiveness of ODA policy. A landmark consensus of international 
society – Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) – places 
ownership as one of its principles for aid effectiveness. 
Table 19. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005)
Principles Meaning
Ownership Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty 
reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.
Alignment Donor countries align behind these objectives and use 
local systems.
Harmonisation Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and 
share information to avoid duplication.
Results Developing countries and donors shift focus to 
development results and results get measured.
Mutual 
accountability
Donors and partners are accountable for development 
results.
However, CPS is not a specific program which directly 
generates specific outcomes. In fact, CPS is a framework which 
promotes the strategic implementation of the ODA policy. That is
why WB uses “Country Partnership Framework” for the same 
document of CPS. CPS documents usually include a frame which 
assesses performance and outcomes of the ODA policy in each 
country. 
67
Table 20. Result Framework in CPS with Philippines (ADB, 2018, 
16)
Country Development Impact Indicators with which the CPS is Aligned 
1. Overall poverty rate will decline from 21.6% in 2015 to 14.0% in 2022 
2. Per capita income will increase from $3,550 in 2015 to $5,000 in 2022 









































Ongoing portfolio Ongoing 
sovereign projects (as of 
30 June 2018): Number: 6 
Amount: $821 million 
Planned operations and 
contribution: 
Sovereign Lending: $3,525 
million of regular OCR and 
$1,003 million of co-
financing for 2018– 2021 
Grant: $5 million from the 
Urban Climate Change 
















7.4% of GDP in 
2022a (2017 
baseline: 5.4%)
This means that CPS is close to the instrument for 
evaluating the effectiveness of the ODA policy rather than the 
target of assessment. Since the outcome of CPS cannot be directly 
measured, our research needs to focus on the functional aspects of 
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CPS. The functions of CPS are closely related to the principles of 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. WB (2000) and ADB 
(2010) suggest CPS as a key instrument for operationalizing the 
principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
From the concept of the Paris Declaration of Aid 
Effectiveness, I created the following questions with regard to the 
assessment of CPS.
l (Ownership) Does CPS promote an active participation of 
developing countries? 
l (Alignment) Does CPS increase the consistency of the aid 
policy?
l (Harmonization) Does CPS prevent overlapping aid?
l (Results) Does CPS encourage both parties to purse the 
same results?
l (Mutual Accountability) Does CPS increase mutual trust?
We can evaluate the outcome of the CPS based on these 
questions. Literature, which deals with the CPS, provides evidence 
for the assessment of the CPS. 




Ownership 1) Its policy documents give relatively clear 
guidance for how it engages in partner countries
2) Korea should strengthen … its strategic view 
of its unique contribution to each country 
context. This may include: deepening policy 
dialogue with partner governments….
3) Policy dialogue with partner countries was 
not sufficient in the process of CPS.
4) Communication with partner countries seems 









Alignment 1) Korea’ s development assistance is highly 
valued by the Government of Cambodia as it is 






1) The CPS also defines a clear division of 
labour among the main Korean actors at country 
level involved in managing Korea’s ODA.
2) Due to insufficient strategy, effective and 




Results 1) Current CPS fails to provide specific 
performance objectives and evaluation 
indicators.
2) Most of CPS in Korea did not provide specific 
plan and objectives which is needed for the







1) Nor does it provide an indicative budget for 
Korea ’ s development co-operation or offer 





2) These country strategies would serve as an 
even more effective tool for accountability and 
planning if they included: (i) an indicative budget 
for the strategy period, (ii) objectives for policy 
dialogue with partner country governments …
3) Due to the decentralization of ODA 
governance, the trust of ODA policy damaged.
4) CPS is not being operated faithfully.
5) Operational strategy and business plan are 








Literatures evaluating CPS in Korea includes both positive 
assessments and negative assessments. First, current CPS 
articulates procedures for the participation of partner countries but 
does not provide ample opportunities for in-depth communication. 
Second, there is one literature (OECD, 2018) about the alignment, 
which evaluated that CPS in Korea aligned well with a partner 
country. Third, OECD (2018) assessed that there was a clear 
division of labor among actors, but BAI raised the problem of an 
ineffective implementing system. Fourth, CPS in Korea does not 
provide specific results in its CPS documents. Fifth, CPS in Korea 
has a weakness in accountability due to lack of required information, 
decentralization of its ODA governance, and operational strategy. 
Though there are some positive comments regarding the 
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outcomes of CPS, CPS in Korea demonstrated insufficient 
performance from the perspective of programmatic dimension. 
Among the factors of policy failure in Dolowitz & Marsh (2000)’s 
study, which includes uninformed, incomplete, and inappropriate 
transfer, the case of CPS in Korea is close to incomplete transfer. 
Since many countries and IGOs already have been implementing 
CPS, a lack of information might not be a critical factor. The 
inappropriate transfer may not be applied to the case of CPS in 
Korea, because Korean government still has a significant level of 
discretion in establishing CPS. Although OECD DAC assessed the 
CPS in Korea in diverse aspects, such assessments were close to 
direction rather than specific contents. In addition, since each 
country establishes a different style of CPS, Korea also could 
establish the most appropriate type of CPS in Korea. To summarize, 
CPS in Korea is close to incomplete policy transfer and was not 
successful in terms of programmatic dimension.
Then, what factors contribute to transfer in the 
establishment of CPS in Korea? Incomplete transfer refers to a 
situation that crucial elements of the policy are not transferred 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). When it comes to CPS, policy dialogue 
with partner countries, consultation with relevant organizations, 
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tools for enforcement, and monitoring process are suggested as 
crucial elements. As many documents from OECD DAC and Korean 
government demonstrate, CPS in Korea meets formal requirements 
of CPS, however, the elements of CPS do not function as expected. 
As I discussed in programmatic approach, CPS in Korea seems to 
miss several crucial elements of CPS. Policy dialogue is not enough
to develop in-depth communications. Implementation system is 
weak. Lack of appropriate monitoring system results in the low 
level of accountability of both countries. 
Theories of policy transfer do not provide general 
explanations about the reason why crucial elements are not adopted 
in the process of policy transfer. In the case studies of policy 
transfer, reasons for incomplete transfer are specific to each issue. 
For example, in the case study of Gateway Review Process 
(Fawcett & Marsh, 2012), reluctance of the private sector, possible 
conflicts of interests, and non-participation of Treasury are
suggested as reasons for incomplete policy transfer. In a similar 
vein, the specific context needs to be examined in order to find the 
reasons for incomplete transfer. 
Many documents examined in this study provide plausible 
clues for incomplete transfer. Lee (2014) raises the problem of 
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exclusive policy process in the formulation of CPS. Korean 
government did not provide sufficient opportunities for participation 
to civil society and relevant parties. This exclusive policy making 
process seemed to contribute to speedy adoption of CPS, however, 
Korean government sacrificed the opportunities for formation of 
social consensus and utilization from diverse parties (Ibid). Jeong 
(2014) raises the same problem in the process of CPS in Korea. In 
addition, Jeong (2014) argues that the participation of branch 
offices of Korean government and that of stakeholders of partner 
countries should be expanded for the effectiveness of CPS. Overall, 
Korean government overlooked the importance of participation from 
diverse actors, thus, it sacrificed opportunities for valuable 
feedbacks and further improvement.
Project-based approach in ODA process also acts as
obstacle for complete transfer of CPS (Lee, 2014; Jeong, 2014). 
Though Korean government emphasizes the strategic allocation of 
ODA resources, actual implementation of ODA resources are still 
based on individual projects. This practice significantly hampers the 
strategic utilization of ODA resources. According to the research of 
MOFA (2013), project-based approach is preferred to other 
approaches for the easiness of management and visibility. However, 
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it severely sacrifices the achievement of inclusive policy objective 
(MOFA, 2013). In short, though Korean government establishes the
integrated country strategy for ODA, project-based approach 
prevents Korean government from effectively actualizing its 
intended objective. 
A short time of preparation can be suggested as a factor of 
incomplete transfer. According to the research of Kim et al. (2013), 
many developed countries did not have complete form of CPS at 
first. Developed countries including France are still in the process 
of improving CPS based on their experience. Compared to 
developed countries, Korea has a short history in terms of CPS, so 
Korean government does not have rich experience regarding the 
implementation of CPS. In addition, the lack of capacity in relevant 
organizations also attributes a short history of CPS. Personnel and 
financial resources tend to grow slowly when we consider the 
decision making process of the government, thus, resources for the 
development of CPS may not be secured in a short period of time. 
Except all the factors listed above, many other factors were
raised for the reason of incomplete transfer of CPS in Korea. 
Segregated ODA governance (Kim et al., 2013) and insufficient role 
of ODA governance (BAI, 2015) were also suggested as factors of 
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incompleteness of CPS in Korea. These factors should be examined 
for the successful implementation of CPS in Korea. 
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4.3. How Can CPS be Successful?
Evaluation on the effectiveness of CPS gives insights for the 
development of the policy. First, the government needs to provide 
sufficient opportunities for diverse stakeholders during the process 
of CPS. CPS is a country level document, so CPS needs to reflect all 
the actors of aid in a country. If CPS is not comprehensive, the 
partner countries will rather discuss with individual actors about aid 
programs, which may cause overlapping and dispersed aid. Relevant 
ministries, affiliated governmental agencies, non-governmental 
ODA organizations, and the local office of each agency need to be 
involved in the process of CPS. In order to promote active and 
representative participation, providing more information to diverse 
stakeholders should be accompanied. 
Second, the government needs to pay more attention to 
policy dialogue with partner countries. According to the definition of 
ownership in the Paris Declaration on the Aid Effectiveness (2005), 
ownership is “Developing countries set their own strategies for 
poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption,”
which means that the partner country should not remain passive 
regarding the aid. Partner countries need to have appropriate 
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information regarding the aid plain of donor countries and have 
opportunities to express their opinions to the donor country’s aid 
policy. In this sense, ADB (2007) argued that policy dialogue “is a 
key outcome of the CPS processes” (p.15). However, Korean 
government did not allocate sufficient resources for the policy 
dialogue, so such practice was a target of criticism from OECD, 
researches, and NGOs. In order to have an in-depth understanding 
and communication regarding aid policy between both countries, a 
series of dialogue should be conducted rather than one or two times 
of pro forma meeting. 
Third, the government needs to enhance the program-based 
approach in the ODA policy. Aid policies in Korea are often based 
on a project rather than a program (Kim & Kim, 2012). The 
project-based approach tends to concentrated on temporary 
business, unique objects, and technical assistances, while the 
program-based approach tends to focus on a related set of 
activities, outcomes, and capacity development (MOFA research, 
2013). Although Korean government attempts to reduce the 
overlapping projects in the implementation of ODA, many projects 
are still similar and overlapping (CIDC, 2019), which means that 
CPS does effectively functioning yet. However, the second CPS 
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documents which was established in 2016 suggest individual 
projects as a basic unit of evaluation. When the government 
provides a small amount of aid to partner countries, there is a 
limitation to conduct the program-based approach, because donor 
countries may not implement a series of the project due to the 
limitation of resources. Thus, I recommend that the government 
gradually adopt a program-based approach form the closest partner 
countries, such as Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia. Cases of 
overlapping projects are most frequently found in those countries 
(CIDC, 2019). 
Fourth, the government needs to provide more specific 
objects and indicators for the assessment of the ODA policy. 
Typically, the discourse regarding indicators assumes the existence 
of specific objects, thus, in this study, we will focus on indicators. 
Indicators can help to explain whether both countries are “on track 
toward achieving the intended outcome and to determine whether 
outcomes are achieved” (ADB, 2007). OECD DAC also emphasized 
the importance of indicators with regard to results: “The use of 
indicators is crucial in results reporting as indicators specify how 
expected results have been measured” (OECD DAC, 2012, 82). 
Obviously, Korean government utilizes indicators in its ODA 
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process, but it rarely shares indicators to stakeholders (OECD DAC, 
2012). When the government select indicators, it needs to consider 
the specific situation of the partner country, data collection capacity, 
and the relationship between project/program and indicators. If the 
project is not expected to create a meaningful change of indicator, 
such indicator cannot be used. The government might not prepare 
indicators in every project/program. However, the government can 
gradually expand the application of indicators from certain sectors 
and certain countries. 
Fifth, the government needs to monitor mutual commitments 
in the ODA programs for mutual accountability. Mutual 
accountability depends on trust and partnership. In order to 
increase mutual accountability, the government can utilize evidence 
which is collected by both countries (OECD DAC, 2008). CPS 
documents usually include the a monitoring process. CPS 
documents in Korea also include monitoring mechanism. The 
problem is that monitoring system is not sufficient for the 
enhancement of mutual accountability. Current monitoring 
mechanism in CPS documents is close to general principle regarding 
monitoring rather than specific procedures and plans. Since there 
were no effective monitoring system, the second CPS document 
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could not provide information regarding the monitoring results. In 
the absence of an effective monitoring system, both countries likely 
overlook the existence of CPS until they negotiate the next phase of 
CPS. Thus, in order to remind the importance of CPS for both 
countries, specific procedures and schedules should be provided.






5.1. Summary of Findings and Policy Implications
CPS is a good example of policy transfer because it is 
obvious that CPS is transferred from other countries. As the 
Gateway Review Process maintained its “brand” in policy 
transfer (Fawcett & Marsh, 2012), CPS has specific “brand”, and 
CPSs in different countries has in common its processes and 
contents. In addition, CPS did not exist in Korea before the 
bureaucrats in Korea learned about CPS from other countries. In 
this sense, we can claim that CPS in Korea transferred, which is the 
prerequisite of policy transfer study. Studies on policy transfer 
provide a useful framework to examine diverse aspects of CPS in 
Korea. Frames which were provided by policy transfer researchers 
help us to analysis the actors, origins, objects, degrees, constraints, 
reasons, and factors for policy success and failure in the 
formulation of CPS in Korea. Through the application of policy 
transfer frames, we can describe, explain, and prescribe CPS in 
Korea. 
In the formulation of CPS in Korea, bureaucrats in Korea and 
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OECD DAC played an important role. OECD DAC recommended CPS, 
and bureaucrats in Korea actively learned cases of other countries 
and established CPS. Since Korea had to reference many countries’
cases due to institutional differences, the degree of transfer was 
close to synthesis rather than copying and emulation. There were 
no significant constraints in formulating CPS in Korea. Although the 
segregation of ODA governance can be considered as a constraint, 
it was not critical to prevent Korean government from establishing 
CPS. It would be accurate that such factor delayed the process to 
some degree. For the reason of policy transfer, both voluntary and 
coercive factors influenced the adoption of CPS in Korea. Although 
OECD DAC strongly recommended the adoption of CPS strongly, 
Korean government were willing to improve its ODA policy, thus, 
voluntary aspects were strong. Regarding the outcome of policy 
transfer, there can be two different assessments depending on 
which dimension we focus on. In the dimension of process, although 
there are some weaknesses which need to be complemented, CPS 
in Korea seems to be successfully established. However, when we 
examine the programmatic dimension, many problems are identified. 
Current CPS in Korea is not sufficiently functioning, so more efforts 
need to be made. 
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Many studies on policy transfer have been criticized for their 
weaknesses in prescription. However, we could verify that the 
studies on policy transfer is not weak for the prescription. Policy 
transfer
Figure 3: Logic Model of CPS in Korea
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theory provides a useful frame for the analysis of policy success 
and policy failure. Through utilizing evidence-finding, policy 
transfer theory provides strong suggestions for the improvement of 
policy. In our study, we identified that the process of policy transfer 
of CPS is incomplete rather than uninformed or inappropriate. Based 
on such recognition, we could focus on how to achieve 
completeness in the process of CPS. Specific recommendations, 
such as a series of policy dialogues, collaborative monitoring, a 
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program-based approach are suggested based on an in-depth 
examination of CPS in Korea. This study tried to verify that strong 
prescription can be derived from in-depth analysis of the policy 
process. 
Many studies dealing with ODA policy in Korea has raised 
similar issues repeatedly. The segregation of ODA governance, 
secretiveness in the policy process, project-based approach, and 
weak strategy were the main targets of repetitive criticism. 
However, it is evident that these problems cannot be addressed in a 
short time. In this situation, CPS can be a good platform which 
promotes integration, transparency, program-based approach, and 
strategic implementation. 
Policy learning is a common tool when policy-makers 
search for a solution for a certain problem. However, as we 
identified in the case of CPS, policy learning is easier processed
than completed. The process of adopting some policies might not 
difficult if there are no significant constraints. However, the 
complete policy transfer requires continuous attention and a strong 
will from policy-makers. This is the lesson that we learned from 
the case of CPS and policy transfer theories.
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5.2. Limitations of the Research and Directions for 
Future Research
Several limitations exist in this study. First, studies 
regarding CPS are not sufficient. Studies on policy transfer depend 
on the number of literature because it has to find as much evidence 
as possible for explanation. Many studies were conducted in a short 
period, from 2012 to 2015, a longitudinal approach was limited. 
Studies of non-governmental researchers were scarce so it is 
likely that the opinions of Korean government and OECD DAC are 
overrepresented. Majority of studies on CPS were focused on the 
selection of key partner countries. Second, the experience of 
policy-makers are not included. This study largely depends on all 
types of written documents, however, only using written documents 
as evidence has limitations, Written documents have limitations, 
including nuances, underlying intentions, informal events. If the 
interviews were utilized as complementary evidence, this study 
would have suggested a stronger explanation regarding the process 
of CPS. Third, quantitative data were not utilized. Although 
qualitative data provide solid evidence for the assessment of the 
policy, they are intrinsically subjective. The contents of data can be 
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different depending on the person who write the contents. In this 
sense, quantitative data can contribute to overcoming the limitation 
of qualitative data. Further studies are needed when more evidence 
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한국 공적개발원조 정책 연구




국가별협력전략은 공여국이나 국제원조기관이 핵심적인 수원국들과
원조협력을 어떻게 해 나갈지에 관한 전략문서이다. 국가별협력전략은
보통 중점협력분야, 분야별 원조전략, 중장기 집행계획 및 평가계획을
포함하고 있으며 이러한 내용들은 수원국과의 협의를 통해 작성된다. 
국가별협력전략은 국제원조기구에서 1990년대에 처음 소개되었으며, 
점차 핵심적인 국제개발협력 정책으로 발전해왔다. 현재 국가별
협력전략은 국가들의 원조정책의 질을 평가하는 핵심적인 지표 중
하나가 되었다. 
한편 한국은 1950년 한국전쟁 이후 수원국의 위치를 유지해왔으나, 
이후 강력한 경제발전에 힘입어 대외경제협력기금과 한국국제 협력단
이라는 원조기구를 각각 1987년과 1991년에 창설하기에 이르렀다. 
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한국은 2000년에 선진원조공여국 모임인 경제협력개발기구 개발원조
위원회의 수원국 리스트에서 제외되었고, 2010년에는 선진원조공여국
모임의 일원이 되었다. 국제개발협력의 후발주자로서 한국은 국제원조
기구와 선진원조공여국의 정책들을 적극적으로 배우기 시작하였다. 
이러한 맥락에서 한국 개발협력 정책의 많은 부분들이 전통적인 정책
형성모델보다는 외적 영향으로 형성되었다고 보는 것이 타당하다고
생각된다. 국가별협력전략은 외부의 정책을 채택한 전형적인 사례로 볼
수 있다. 비록 국가별협력전략에 대한 기본적인 문제의식은 2000년대
부터 있었으나 그 형태와 내용에 대한 완전한 인식은 경제협력개발기구
개발원조위원회의 권고 이후에 본격적으로 나타난다. 한국의 국제개발
협력 정책을 다루고 있는 다수의 문서들이 이러한 정책이전 과정의
증거를 제공하고 있다. 
정책이전 이론은 한 제도의 정책에 관한 지식이나 사고가 다른 제도에
채택되는 과정을 의미한다. 이에 관한 이론은 관련된 정책과정을
설명하는 데 유용한 이론적 분석틀을 제공한다. 대표적인 연구는
돌로위츠와 마쉬가 1996년에 했던 연구이다. 이 연구는 정책행위자, 
동기, 대상, 이전의 정도, 기원, 성공요인과 실패요인이라는 분석틀과
함께 정책이전의 다양한 특징들을 제시하고 있다. 본 논문은 한국의
국가별협력전략 정책을 돌로위츠와 마쉬의 연구에서 제시된 분석틀을
중심으로 분석하였다. 정책이전에 관해서 돌로위츠와 마쉬 이외에 많은
선행연구, 후행연구들이 있어 이들 연구들을 종합적으로 활용하였다. 
베넷 (1991), 로즈 (1991), 돌로위츠와 마쉬 (2000), 에반스 (2004), 
포셋과 마쉬 (2011), 돌로위츠 (2017) 등, 1990년대부터 비교적
최근의 연구까지 활용하였다. 
한국의 국가별협력전략에서 주요 행위자는 경제협력개발기구 개발원조
위원회와 한국 정부의 관료들인 것으로 확인되었다. 정책이전의 동기는
강제적인 요소와 자발적인 요소가 복합적으로 작용한 것으로 보여진다. 
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정책이전의 대상은 개념, 목표, 중점협력분야와 협력과정 등을 포괄하는
전체적인 내용이다. 이전의 정도는 모방과 영감의 중간 단계인 혼합에
해당된다. 이전의 기원은 세계은행과 아시아개발은행 그리고 미국, 영국, 
프랑스, 일본 등 선진원조공여국 들인 것으로 확인되었다. 국가별
협력전략에 관한 정책이전은 정책과정의 측면에서 성공적이었던 것으로
보인다. 하지만 불완전한 정책 이전으로 인해 기대했던 정책목적을 달성
하지는 못했던 것으로 보인다. 이러한 분석결과들은 기본적으로 정부와
경제개발협력기구의 정책문서, 국가별협력전략에 관한 연구보고서
등에서 나타난 단서들에 기반해서 합리적으로 도출된 것이다. 
이 연구는 한국 공적개발원조 정책에 몇 가지 함의를 제공한다. 첫째, 
국제기구가 공적개발원조 정책에 행사하는 영향력이 매우 크다는 것을
확인하였다. 특히 경제협력개발기구의 개발원조위원회는 회원국에 대해
주기적인 평가를 실시하는데 각 회원국은 자국 정책에 대한 인식을
긍정적으로 유지하기 위해 이에 상응하는 대응을 할 수밖에 없다. 둘째, 
한국의 공적개발원조 정책은 정책이전에 힘입어 상대적으로 짧은 기간
내에 형성이 되었는데 이러한 과정은 불완전하거나 피상적인 정책의
이전으로 이어질 수 있다는 것을 보여주었다. 셋째로, 공적개발원조가
성공적으로 이루어지기 위해서는 제도의 수입 이후에 그 정착을 위한
노력이 충분히 뒷받침되어야 한다는 것이다. 제도의 수입은 그 자체로는
성공적인 결과를 보장해주지 않는다. 채택된 제도에 대한 지속적인 개선
과정을 통해 제도의 장점을 최대한 활용하려는 노력이 필요하다. 
이 연구의 한계는 다음과 같다. 먼저 한국의 국가별협력전략에 관한
자료가 충분하지 않았다는 것인데 이는 정책이전 연구에서 상당히
중요한 제약요건이다. 정책이전 연구는 특정한 생각이나 프로그램, 
제도가 채택되었다는 구체적인 증거를 기반으로 발전될 수 있는데, 
그러한 증거가 부족할 경우 심화된 연구를 진행할 여지가 줄어들기
때문이다. 한국 정부에서 국가별협력전략을 주요 정책으로 도입하는
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과정에서 단계별로, 그리고 참여자들 별로 어떤 논의들이 제기되었는지에
대한 세부 자료들이 없었다는 것은 아쉬운 점이다. 아울러 국가별협력
전략에 대한 연구가 특정 시기에 편중되어 있고, 인터뷰 등 서면 이외의
자료를 포함하지 못하였고, 양적 자료들을 활용하지 못한 점은 연구의
객관성이나 설득력 측면에서 미흡한 요소로 작용했다. 
주요어 : 정책이전, 국가별협력전략, 공적개발원조, 국제개발협력
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